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An expanded analysis of the origin of the correlation with economic deprivation found in the authors’ representative surveys of right-wing extremist attitudes 
(such as racism, anti-Semitism, and chauvinism), focusing on the underlying dynamics in Germany and the historical aspect of National Socialism. The growing 
prosperity of the West German “economic miracle” of the 1950s served a psychosocial “filling function” to block the narcissistic damage caused by con-
frontation with past crimes and the sense of the nation’s loss of greatness. As this prosperity vanishes for many people during the current economic crisis, the 
filling comes out and the narcissistic wound opens up. What emerges is both what lies underneath and what has been serving as a defense against it, which 
involve authoritarian dynamics. Initially, the metaphor of “narcissistic filling” will be developed through our analysis of group discussions conducted as part of 
our qualitative study (of 2008). The developed hypotheses will thereafter be introduced to our following representative survey (of 2010) and confirmed by 
means of quantitative methods.
The relation between relative deprivation and antidemo-
cratic attitudes has been thoroughly confirmed by means 
of empirical studies. Increasing right-wing extremist atti-
tudes in Germany and other European countries have been 
discussed in connection with experienced or anticipated 
loss of economic status (Heitmeyer 2010; Küpper and Zick 
2010; Decker et al. 2012; Zick 2010; Decker et al. 2012). At 
the same time, these studies illuminate the potentially inte-
grating function of economic participation and on the 
other hand the loss of legitimacy of democracy in the event 
of economic crisis and deprivation (Heitmeyer and End-
rikat 2008). Whether measured as “fascism,” “right-wing-
extremism,” or “authoritarianism,” this loss of legitimacy 
is accompanied by ideologies grounded in resentment and 
prejudice (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Cohrs and Ibler 
2009). Experience of deprivation is closely connected with 
denouncement of the fundamental principles of demo-
cratic cooperation and denial of recognition of “the other.” 
This holds not only for economic deprivation but also for 
political and social deprivation (Decker et al. 2006). As 
there is extensive empirical evidence for this connection, it 
has a strong influence on research on right-wing-
extremism, especially in Germany (Heitmeyer 1994; End-
rikat et al. 2002; Schmidt et al. 2003). Unsurprisingly, 
“deprivation” has been considered a “key concept of social 
psychology” (Pettigrew 2001). Ever since the notion of 
“relative deprivation” was introduced to social research by 
Stouffer and his colleagues (Stouffer et al. 1949), it has 
been broadly applied and adapted in the field of social psy-
chology (Smith et al. 2011). However, different means of 
measurement produce divergent outcomes (Rippl and 
Baier 2005) and raise the question, what exactly is being 
measured by whom.
Although some effort has been made to integrate theor-
etical conceptualizations (Rippl and Seipel 2002), the dis-
cussion lacks a thorough understanding or explanation of 
the connection between deprivation and so-called right-
wing attitudes. Although one of the central tasks of social 
psychology lies in analyzing the mediating processes 
between societal conditions and their individual effects, 
this task has not entirely been mastered. In spite of refined 
concepts such as the differentiation between “individual” 
and “fraternal deprivation” (Runciman 1966), empirical 
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research has paid little attention to the question why. Yet, 
social psychological research has a rich history of theor-
izing on this question.
Analyzing the relationship between the individual and the 
society was the focus of the “studies on the authoritarian 
personality” (Adorno et al. 1950), which are considered a 
“milestone of empirical social research” (Fahrenberg and 
Steiner 2004). What is more, not only did the Critical The-
orists of the Frankfurt school combine quantitative and 
qualitative approaches to describe the conditions that 
transport the threat to democracy, they also sought a pro-
found critique of those conditions (Habermas 1968; Rook 
et al. 1993). In terms of a Weberian ideal type, the “auth-
oritarian personality” has a high price to pay for participat-
ing in the societal and economic power of authority by 
submitting. If this account remains unbalanced, his/her 
aggression will be directed against representations of the 
society that demands submission. However, with the cog-
nitive turn the paradigms have shifted in the scientific 
community. As a result, “critical theorizing” of coercive 
socialization seems to have lost its legitimacy, and interpre-
tive approaches in social psychology research are still rare. 
Although the empirical results of the “studies” are still 
being confirmed, they are simply labeled as “auth-
oritarianism.” The “authoritarian personality” seems to 
have become as obsolete as psychoanalysis as a theory of 
socialization that allows the individual to be con-
ceptualized as embedded in societal structures (Marcuse 
1963; Decker 2010).
For understanding prejudice, models of social cognition in 
group processes, such as information processing and the 
intergroup conflict paradigm, have become dominant 
(Mummendey 1985). Ever since the model of realistic 
group conflict (Sherif and Sherif 1979) was reformulated 
towards conflict being understood as the result of mere cat-
egorization (Tajfel and Turner 1979), the theory itself has 
been repeatedly modified and complemented. For instance, 
motivational assumptions added to Turner and Tajfel’s the-
ory of social identity have led to the idea of an individual’s 
need for positive (group) identity and self-enhancement. 
This need requires a relation and therefore entails in-group 
favoritism and discrimination against the out-group. As a 
consequence, it is only by devaluating the “other” that the 
in-group and therefore the individual gains in self-esteem 
(Zick 1996).
According to Terror Management Theory, these processes 
become even more pronounced under mortality salience, 
where an awareness of death primes individuals to regulate 
their self-esteem (Greenberg et al. 1997). This statement is 
not only in accord with the correlation of cognitive rigidity 
with self-enhancement (Stangor and Thompson 2002) and 
with ego involvement (Schultz et al. 1997); it might also 
illuminate parts of the connection between deprivation and 
right-wing extremist attitudes. In their experiments in Ger-
many, Jonas and Fritsche demonstrate that under con-
ditions of mortality salience, participants were more likely 
to choose the Deutschmark as a symbol of cultural identifi-
cation than a control group (Jonas and Fritsche 2005). 
Consequently, an economic token helps people to cope with 
a threat to their self-esteem. In the following we will con-
nect the threads of theory and research as described so far.
One of the central ideas underlying the “studies on the 
authoritarian personality” was coined by Erich Fromm, 
who proposed that authority served as “prosthetic secur-
ity” (1936, 179) and could therefore adopt a regulating 
function in situations of threat. Even earlier, Georg Simmel 
pointed out that people willingly subordinate themselves to 
authority (1908). In Freudian terms the authority serves as 
a substitute for the individual’s ego ideal and the members 
of a group identify with each other (Freud 1921). Desires 
for grandeur and power can be satisfied by means of “nar-
cissistic compensation” (Fromm 1936, 179). Hence, preju-
dice is always related to regulation of self-esteem, which 
shall therefore serve as a starting point for our exploration 
of the connection between deprivation and right-wing 
extremist attitudes.
1. Our Studies on Right-wing Extremism in the Center of Society
The “center studies” are based on representative surveys on 
political attitudes conducted every other year since 2002, 
with between 2,500 and 5,000 participants in each wave 
(Decker et al. 2003; Decker and Brähler 2005; Decker et al. 
2006; Decker and Brähler 2008; Decker et al. 2012). In 
addition, we conducted a study based on group discussions 
IJCV : Vol. 7 (1) 2013, pp. 135 – 149
Decker et al.: Economic Prosperity as “Narcissistic Filling” 138
in 2007 and 2008, whose participants were recruited from 
the 2006 survey.
This paper presents findings from a “mixed method” study 
combining quantitative and qualitative methods. Rather 
than distinguishing approaches hierarchically, for example 
by reducing the function of qualitative data to explorative 
purposes, we emphasize a methodological triangulation in 
the strict sense (Flick 2010) as has proven productive in 
studies on prejudice (Flecker et al. 2005; Krüger and Pfaff 
2006). With Dilthey, we posit the primacy of under-
standing the subject matter over separating methodological 
approaches. Our research aims at understanding the con-
nection between deprivation and right-wing-extremism, 
assuming that we are dealing with historically variable phe-
nomena. 
1.1. Qualitative Design: Theme-centered Group Discussions
On the basis of the 2006 representative survey on right-
wing extremist attitudes (Decker et al. 2006), we conducted 
group discussions throughout Germany with participants 
who we categorized as right-wing extremist, partly right-
wing extremist or not right-wing extremist according to the 
survey data. The study aimed to analyze in detail the psy-
chosocial genesis of political attitudes (Decker et al. 2008). 
Our methodology was based on a combination of quali-
tative social science methods and psychoanalysis. We devel-
oped a concept of group discussions building on Leithäuser 
and Volmerg (1988) and their conceptualization of “theme-
centered group discussions,” as well as on the approach by 
Ralf Bohnsack (2007) who developed the notion of “collec-
tive patterns of orientation” (1997, 495, translated).
Our approach to interpreting the transcripts uses psycho-
analytic methods by transferring the analysis of counter-
transference (Devereux 1967) and “scenic understanding” 
(Lorenzer 1973) to psychosocial research (see Bereswill et 
al. 2010 for an English introduction to the method). How-
ever, while clinical psychoanalysis seeks to (re)construct 
biographical and individual forms of conflict and defense, 
the subject matter of social research is the general in the 
particular. Psychosocial research deals with the way forms 
of conflict and defense are repeated unconsciously in the 
setting of the investigation and always (also) have a “collec-
tive” meaning. Access to this level of meaning can be gained 
via the analysis of transference and counter-transference in 
the research process and via “scenic understanding.” Trans-
ferring Lorenzer’s concept to psychosocial research, the set-
ting of a qualitative investigation can be regarded as an 
ensemble of “scenes” in which both participants and 
researchers become involved, and which are also motivated 
by unconscious conflicts and defenses against them. They 
are “(re)mis en scène,” i.e. partly (re)produced in their 
original unconscious formation. Psychoanalysis has long 
been based on this phenomenon of reproduction, the idea 
having been introduced by Freud (1914) who contrasted 
the notion of an unconscious repetition and enactment of 
conflictual psychic material to remembering. Group dis-
cussions stimulate such (re)productions, as well as the 
development of relations of transference. In addition, a 
group setting produces scenes that transcend the individ-
ual. Access to unconscious forms of conflict and defense 
that are (re)produced in the group discussion and interview 
settings can be gained via exploring the researcher’s own 
irritations, affects, and associations in response to the tran-
scripts/texts. But how to grasp the conflicts and defenses on 
a “collective” level, given that they are always intertwined 
with the individual and neurotic? The interpreted scenes 
might be referred back to the research question. “The scenic 
interpretation is in itself a way of validating statements” 
(Lochel 1997, 69, translated) while at the same time, those 
interpretations have to be continually validated by the tran-
script. To analyze our data we formed a group that met at 
least once a week to discuss individual interpretations. To 
further intersubjectively validate our findings, we were 
supervised by the psychoanalyst Elfriede Löchel, Ph.D.
Altogether we conducted twelve group discussions in nine 
regions throughout Germany with participants who, we 
categorized as right-wing extremist, partly right-wing 
extremist or not right-wing extremist in their attitudes on 
the basis of the survey. Initially we had planned to form 
groups with homogenous political attitudes from the sur-
vey sample. Due to a low response rate however, we were 
unable to recruit enough participants with right-wing 
extremist attitudes. We therefore directly recruited two 
groups that were considered right-wing extremist by local 
social workers. The number of participants varied between 
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three and six. The participants were of various age groups 
(range 18–89 years) and had different social and edu-
cational backgrounds. As the introductory “theme,” they 
were asked by two facilitators to discuss amongst them-
selves how they experienced living in their town or region. 
The facilitators did not intervene much during the follow-
ing conversation, except to stimulate further discussion. At 
some point they introduced the period of the discussants’ 
childhood (unless they had already brought it up them-
selves).
1.2. Quantitative Design: Representative Surveys
On behalf of the University of Leipzig, the polling firm 
USUMA (Berlin) conducted surveys on the distribution 
and influencing factors of right-wing extremist attitudes 
since 2002. The data presented below (see section 2.2) is 
based on face-to-face interviews conducted at 258 sample 
points (N = 2,411) in 2010.
The core of the studies is the scale on right-wing extremist 
attitudes, comprising “approval of right-wing dictatorship,” 
“chauvinism,” “racism/xenophobia,” “anti-Semitism,” 
“social Darwinism,” and “relativization of National Social-
ism.” Each of the six dimensions comprises three items, so 
participants were asked to respond to eighteen items on a 
five-point Likert-scale (between “I strongly agree” and “I 
strongly disagree”). To give a few examples, one of the items 
measuring xenophobia was “Foreigners only come to this 
country to take advantage of the welfare state” (our trans-
lation). Chauvinism was measured by items such as: “What 
we need in our country is to forcefully and aggressively 
assert German interests towards foreign countries” (our 
translation). (See Annex 1 for a complete list of items).
Several items on the estimation of the economic situation 
and different forms of deprivation were correlated with the 
right-wing-extremism scale in order to assess their impact 
as influencing factors. In order to estimate individual econ-
omic deprivation, we assessed the subjective experience of 
loss of prosperity as well as concerns about the individual 
employment situation (Decker et al. 2012).
Experience of unemployment and the level of income were 
used as markers of the objective economic situation. How 
participants assessed the current state of the economy 
served as an indicator of economic deprivation at a collec-
tive or societal level. Since individual economic deprivation 
is likely to be accompanied by social deprivation, i.e. 
experiences of loss in social life, the latter were also 
assessed. Furthermore, we tested the impact of political 
deprivation, i.e. the feeling of powerlessness related to par-
ticipation in democracy, on the development of right-wing 
extremist attitudes.
In our 2006 surveys all measures of deprivation proved to 
have a strong impact on the endorsement of right-wing 
extremist statements (Decker et al. 2006, 122–27). It still 
remains open how this influence might have changed given 
the current economic crisis. In addition, our 2010 survey 
includes socio-economic factors as moderating variables. 
We calculated two linear regression models. The first 
model comprises markers of economic, social, and political 
deprivation; the second includes the variables of edu-
cational background, age, and gender as socio-structural 
variables and possible moderating factors (see section 2.2).
2. Findings
Building on the findings of the preceding representative 
survey that confirm a correlation between economic depri-
vation and political attitudes (Decker et al. 2006), the 
group discussions allow a more detailed exploration of the 
individual and collective meanings ascribed to those 
experiences. We now explore how participants discuss 
prosperity and trace the historical roots.
2.1 Material Prosperity as a Core Issue of the Group Discussions
Without having been asked by the interviewers, partici-
pants brought up the topic of prosperity as a core issue in 
eight out of twelve group discussions (Decker et al. 2008). 
The topic was mentioned with explicit reference to the 
“economic miracle” of the 1950s and, as such, contrasted 
to the immediate post-war period. Some of the partici-
pants experienced this period themselves, while others 
talked about their parents’ experiences. In order to analyze 
in detail different aspects of the experience of prosperity 
and economic decline or the anticipation of economic 
decline, we selected one group discussion (in the major 
western German industrial city of Dortmund) for the pur-
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pose of this article. We chose the Dortmund discussion 
because it includes vivid accounts of the experience of 
prosperity, a first-person narrative of the transition from 
the war to the postwar period, and indications of inter-
generational aspects (for analysis of the other discussions 
see Decker et al. 2008).
Firstly, we quote and summarize how the issue of prosper-
ity is discussed and then contextualize the statements with 
regard to the group dynamic as well as to their individual 
and intergenerational meanings: how do the participants 
situate the issue in their individual and family biographies? 
Which individual and collective meanings are ascribed to 
experienced or anticipated economic decline?
2.1.1. Generations
“And that’s another issue of the parents’ generation, who defined 
themselves by it – my parents as well”
Two men and two women participated in the Dortmund 
discussion, three of them in their sixties, one in her forties. 
The discussion is shaped by significant differences in econ-
omic and social status between the discussants, since two of 
them (Herr Wernecke and Frau Wagner, see below) have 
more education and a significantly higher income than the 
other two (Frau Meier and Herr Winkler). Cor-
respondingly, Herr Wernecke and Frau Wagner attempt to 
document higher status and subtly exclude the other two 
participants.
In response to the question regarding what life is like in 
Dortmund, the participants begin discussing shopping 
opportunities in the Rhein/Ruhr region. Their discussion 
about participating in material consumption and access to 
material commodities refers indirectly to the shared 
experience of prosperity. Subsequently, they touch on 
intergenerational aspects by speaking about their 
childrens’ generation(s) and by discussing symbols of 
status. Frau Wagner notes the pressure of stigmatization 
on children whose parents cannot afford to buy them 
brand clothing:
Frau Wagner:1  Now, that’s an issue amongst kids of poor people 
and of rich people, right. Those of the rich people suppress the 
poor kids: “Oh, look at your clothes!” or  └2those
Herr Wernecke:  └Yeah.
Herr Winkler: Those, who don’t have anything, they try to – if, for 
example, there is a weak guy – they will try to steal his clothes, 
’cause they themselves don’t have anything. That’s one of those 
things.
Frau Wagner: That’s not the child’s issue though, that’s an issue of 
self-confidence, I can
Herr Winkler: No, no, that’s an issue of the pare- (.) yeah, sure.
Frau Wagner continues exploring the parents’ responsibil-
ity to help their children gain self-confidence without the 
use of material status symbols.
Frau Wagner: And that’s another issue of my parents’ generation, 
who defined themselves by it. My parents as well. My mother 
would be like “look, Aigner, Joop”! She wanted other people to 
see: “hey, └we succeeded in life,” right.
Herr Winkler: └ Not -.3 No. No.
Frau Wagner: I’m just saying, if I had the Prada label on the back or 
whatever, that would be my business. I’d know I have a cash-
mere sweater but that would be enough. Whereas for my 
mother, being a member of the other generation - - it’s import-
ant for her, that other people also see how she succeeded 
(L1460–14914).
Frau Wagner is speaking as a product of the “economic 
miracle” in the West Germany of the 1950s and therefore 
emphasizes that she differs from her parents, who grew up 
during wartime (L1324). She also contrasts her experience 
with the “problems […] of kids kids nowadays” (L1325). 
This background frames the issue of prosperity as well as 
the significance of its documentation. Current experi-
ences of deprivation are indexed historically, with pros-
perity being contrasted with the immediate post-war 
period. At the same time, Frau Wagner alludes to the 
necessity to reassure oneself and others of participation in 
prosperity; she locates the wish to document prosperity in 
her parents as well as in her children. Although she claims 
not to need the mirroring of others, she does articulate 
her enjoyment of the goods and symbols of prosperity.
1 All names are anonymized.
2 Speaking simultaneously.
3 “-”: pause or interruption.
4 “L”: Line number in the original transcript.
IJCV : Vol. 7 (1) 2013, pp. 135 – 149
Decker et al.: Economic Prosperity as “Narcissistic Filling” 141
Herr Wernecke joins the discussion of historical references 
initiated by Frau Wagner.
Herr Wernecke: That’s correct. On the other, on the other hand, 
when I went to school at the end of the forties, or the early 
fifties, the social divide was immense. There was a high unem-
ployment rate, there were the so-called newly rich, who by 1948, 
uhm, became rich very quickly. And who are supposed to be the 
norm for the normal public, who - ? Prosperity or well-, well-
being was not the standard before the second half of the 1950s. 
Then, in the 1960s, ok, I must say, the economic miracle uhm 
had an impact (L1573–1580).
Herr Wernecke describes the economic divide before the 
“economic miracle” of the 1950s and 1960s as pronounced. 
Only then would many Germans in the former West Ger-
many be able to participate in societal prosperity, as 
expressed in the slogan “Prosperity for all” (“Wohlstand 
für alle”) coined by West German Economy Minister Lud-
wig Erhard in 1957 (Erhard 1957). It marks the political 
promise of economic participation that Herr Wernecke 
(together with other participants) considers fulfilled in the 
time period of the “economic miracle”. Once more, the 
end of World War II as a historic event frames the topic of 
economic prosperity.
2.1.2. The Promise of Prosperity
Frau Meier refers to the era of the “economic miracle” as a 
period of “construction,” (Aufbau) in an almost nostalgic 
way.
Frau Meier: Right, especially, ’cause back in the day, everything was 
being rebuilt. It was like, let’s say, it wasn’t like you could uhm, 
that you could uhm – . Especially, you wouldn’t have a car, like 
–. My father bought his first car in the sixties and uhm (3),5 
then it just went – since then, things were in the flow even 
more, right (L1158–1169).
The discussant describes how, in the 1960s, her father 
apparently bought a car as a symbol of prosperity. Her 
phrasing, that “things were even more in the flow,” alludes 
to the reconstruction (of Germany after World War II) as 
an “automatic process” bringing prosperity into the 
family.
Frau Meier from Dortmund is a highly engaged discussant, 
both quantitatively and affectively. Later in the discussion 
she will introduce the “issue” of “foreigners,” with the 
effect that the group, whose members were categorized as 
“non-right-wing extremist” (according to our survey data), 
takes an unexpected turn. But before analyzing how state-
ments on the economic situation connect with xenophobic 
or racist sentiments, let us turn to Frau Meier’s biography. 
After the other participants have introduced themselves, 
Frau Meier joins in with a relatively long answer to the 
facilitators’ question, what life was like in Dortmund. She 
introduces herself as a “displaced person” (“Vertriebene,” 
L125) and describes how she experienced severe poverty at 
the end of the war and during the family’s flight “from the 
Russians” when her hometown Breslau (Wrocław since 
1945) was liberated. While her father was serving as a sol-
dier, her mother took her and her siblings westwards. Her 
sister was temporarily lost during their flight.
Frau Meier: And then we arrived at my aunt’s house in uhm Tor-
gau. We got two small rooms there, but at least we had a roof 
over our heads. And the winter was so hard back then, and we 
collected every piece of wood – although we were not allowed 
to do that – just to get it warm in there. (...) You know, we had 
nothing, we had no money, nothing at all, and uhm, my mother 
was glad to get something from the farmer once in a while. 
Well, and then, at some point my father came from captivity, 
and it was like: where is my sister. And my father had the Red 
Cross search for her (1), and she was found (L125–148).
Telling her story, Frau Meier is intensely involved emo-
tionally, thus marking her early experiences of the post-war 
flight as still highly meaningful today. This passage forms a 
significant contrast with that of the newly acquired quality 
of life quoted above, on both the thematic and the affective 
level. In addition, her family’s gain in prosperity was fol-
lowed by Frau Meier’s own moderate economic ascent, as 
she married and created her own business with her hus-
band (L1063–1083).
In the discussion Frau Meier introduces her father as a key 
figure in her life and family, and confirms this when speak-
ing about his parenting style.
5 (n) Length of pause in seconds.
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Frau Meier:  And I got my driver’s license and I had to - or rather 
my father told us what to study. My brother had to become an 
electrician, although he wanted to do something totally differ-
ent and so did the other brother. My sister wanted to become a 
hairdresser, but had to go to housekeeping school, and I had to 
become a saleswoman, though it didn’t suit me, but what could 
I do. Oh well, and then I went into training for three years and 
(3) well, it went on like that (L1049–1056).
With the father not taking into account his children’s 
career wishes, this description already illustrates an auth-
oritarian parenting style. As Frau Meier relates, this also 
included severe physical punishment. Except for Frau 
Wagner, who is about twenty years younger than the 
others, the participants share similar experiences. All three 
of them report and legitimize, in hindsight, how parents 
and teachers beat them severely.
Frau Meier: But did it do any harm to anybody? No, it didn’t. And 
nowadays, (...) whenever any father or mother beats their child 
– I mean, nobody beats a child without reason, right 
(L1244-1256).
Whereas the other participants distance themselves to 
some extent from their parents’ disciplinary practices in 
the course of the discussion, Frau Meier remains highly 
identified with her father. The father of the period of econ-
omic growth demanded submission and is still obeyed to 
this day. Although alluding to her own desires and expec-
tations for life, Frau Meier does not acknowledge them, nor 
does she express any anger at her father or any feeling of 
disappointment. However, she is highly enraged and 
aggressive when she expresses resentment towards 
“foreigners”: 
Frau Meier: Now we’ve got a lot of Turks in Dortmund. I’ve got 
nothing against foreigners, no matter where they come from, 
black or white. But they dare to do things that we mustn’t. They 
park in the middle of the street, they yak at the corner, [she hits 
the table repeatedly], they stop and talk, and when you honk 
your horn, they get sassy. When the police get called and they 
see the Turks, they run away. And it’s really terrible in our city, 
they run rampant, they buy up every shop, they buy every house 
that gets empty. I’d say, we’ll reach 80 percent Turks soon. (1) 
One shouldn’t tar them all with the same brush, but it’s not nice 
anymore. They live in uhm, uhm, real ghettos, and they think 
they got rights everywhere, and uhm they can get away with 
anything. If we wanna go to their country, we have to adjust to 
them. If we did what they dare to do, JI believe we’d end up in 
jailJ6. And they always draw their knives and shit. (2) Well yeah, 
and yeah, it’s us here today (7) (L187–203).
Throughout the group discussion Frau Meier repeatedly 
bursts out in hatred and, as if evoked by her strong affect, 
she seems to motivate the other participants to express 
resentments as well. A xenophobic consensus is successively 
created.
Frau Meier: But I keep wondering – the Turks around here, they 
never go to work, I always see the same lot on the street, morn-
ing, noon, and night. They don’t go to work. But then she drives 
a big BMW. He drives a big Mercedes. They got a house. I don’t 
know how they do that, how they get that money - whether it’s 
all by selling pot and whatnot, I don’t know (...) Yeah, it makes 
you wonder sometimes └ how those nationalities do that, right.
Frau Wagner:   └ Yeah.
Herr Winkler: └ That was a Polish guy.7
Frau Meier:  They don’t go to work.  Just hang around in the pedes-
trian precinct. Starting at
Frau Wagner: dubious business
Herr Wernecke: Right.
Frau Meier: 9 am  └ , there’s only Turks in the café or outside on the 
street. It’s insane!
Herr Winkler:   └ It’s the Mafia, slip me something, and then 
they have to 
Frau Wagner: protection money (2) right.
Herr Winkler:  Yeah, yeah (L815–836).
We understand this strong affect as envy that is displaced 
onto “the Turks” and other groups of people, who are 
associated with what Frau Meier has wished for herself. She 
therefore represents the experience of deprivation. In the 
group discussion we can observe an authoritarian dynamic 
in the classic sense of the term: identification with econ-
omic well-being as a powerful authority or ideal, while, at 
the same time aggression is played out against minorities, 
who are, in turn, fantasized as powerful. As indicated 
above, the other participants join Frau Meier in expressing 
6 J: Laughter 7 Frau Meier and Herr Winkler know each other 
personally.
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resentment against migrants, especially against Muslims 
(“those wearing headscarves,” Frau Wagner) whom they 
differentiate from other groups of immigrants that are sup-
posedly closer “to us” (L1527–1579). Adorno coined the 
image of “bicyclist characters: ‘above they bow, they kick 
below’” (Adorno et al. 1950, 422, footnote 25). By suppor-
ting Frau Meier’s rage against migrants that she fantasizes 
as powerful and wealthy, the other participants join her 
and thus create an authoritarian group dynamic.
Another remark shows how the rage is directed at whoever 
is suspected of leading “the good life without working” and 
who is imagined to possess property, cars, money, and 
drugs and be free to do whatever they want:
Frau Meier: The standard of living got more expensive for us, the – 
for the little man, who only got a few Deutschmarks. But not for 
th- the ones up there,8 who earn thousands of bucks a month. 
On top of that, they get free prescriptions of Viagra from their 
doctors and they get like - [heavy breathing] (L663–666).
Authoritarian aggression seems to emerge whenever the 
promise of prosperity is unfulfilled.
2.2. Economic Prosperity as “Narcissistic Filling”
In order to elucidate the relation between deprivation and 
right-wing extremist attitudes, we suggest understanding 
prosperity as serving the psychosocial function of a “narcis-
sistic filling.” The term was coined by Morgenthaler (1976, 
1988) as part of his theory of perversion, which “fills – some-
what like a dental filling – a cavity in the regulation of self-
esteem acquired in childhood” (Morgenthaler 1976, 170).
With this metaphor we also refer back to Alexander and 
Margarethe Mitscherlich (1967), who “diagnosed” the 
majority of non-Jewish Germans after 1945 as incapable of 
mourning. Their “diagnosis” builds on the psychoanalytic 
understanding of response to a significant loss of an auth-
ority and its correlation with the loss of self-esteem. 
Deploying the Freudian concept of “mourning” versus 
“melancholia” in social psychology, they bring to light pro-
cesses effective in the majority of Germans after 1945. Fol-
lowing Freud, they describe the functional response to a 
significant loss, e.g. of a beloved person, as “slowly detach-
ing oneself from lost object relations” (Mitscherlich and 
Mitscherlich 1975, 66). Working through this process of 
mourning means to finally accept “definitive change in 
reality brought about by the loss of the object.” (ibid., 64). 
Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich transfer the notion of the 
response to an individual object loss to the collective level 
by combining it with Freud’s analysis of mass or large 
group processes: “The individual gives up his ego ideal and 
substitutes for it the group ideal as embodied in the leader” 
(Freud 1959, 78 [org. 1921]). According to this analysis, for 
the majority of Germans in National Socialism the 
“Führer” Hitler represented a “grandiose self” image with 
which they identified. He replaced the ego ideal of every 
individual who identified with the National Socialist idea 
of “German greatness,” and by following the “Führer” they 
realized parts of this ego ideal (Mitscherlich and Mit-
scherlich 1975). “He was the object on which Germans 
depended … and … represented and revived the ideas of 
omnipotence that we all cherish about ourselves from 
infancy; his death, and his devaluation by the victors, also 
implied the loss of a narcissistic object and, accordingly, an 
ego- or self-impoverishment and devaluation. (ibid.: 26). 
With the victory of the Allies and the collapse of the con-
struct of the “Third Reich” they lost (the identification 
with) the collective ideal and therefore the grandiose “self”.
With their theorizing the Mitscherliches illuminate the 
connection between a defense against a narcissistic damage 
and the reconstruction of Germany after the war. The nar-
cissistic loss could have led to collective melancholia (Mit-
scherlich and Mitscherlich 1967, 1975). Yet, instead of 
recognizing the loss of an ideal grandiose self, the majority 
of Germans not only covered over this loss, but also 
replaced it by means of “narcissistic filling.” What is more, 
they would also have had to recognize the guilt of the war 
8 This is the only moment in the discussion that 
Frau Meier (or anybody else) points at those “up 
there” as the privileged. She might be indirectly 
alluding to the two participants whose higher econ-
omic status is higher than hers.
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of annihilation and the Holocaust, organized by Germans. 
Instead, according to Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich (1967, 
1975), they withdrew all the psychic investment with which 
they had adored Hitler and done their “duty.” They dis-
avowed the crimes, derealized their experiences and exter-
nalized the guilt, for example by displacing it onto Hitler, 
or by weighing their guilt against the guilt of others and 
identifying as wrongly accused victims, or, on the other 
hand, by identifying with the victors. As Rothe shows in 
her qualitative interview study on the aftermath of the 
Holocaust in several generations of non-Jewish Germans, 
even in the second and third generation after National 
Socialism, defense processes against narcissistic damage are 
induced whenever the Holocaust is evoked. According to 
Rothe’s analysis via “scenic understanding” (see above) the 
core scene that is “(re)mis en scene” or (re)produced in the 
interviews is a confrontation with the crimes of the Holo-
caust (Rothe 2009, 2012) and as such relates back to the 
confrontation by the Allies. The participants (who were 
either children during National Socialism or born after-
wards) spoke as if accused of participation, which can only 
be understood if processes of intergenerational trans-
mission and identification with the construct of the nation 
are taken into account.
Coming back to the thesis developed above, the “collective 
narcissism” that was massively damaged by the breakdown 
of National Socialism was replaced by the economic boom, 
by the “feeling of ‘how competent we are’” (Adorno 1986, 
122). Democracy was accepted because life can be easy in 
democracy (ibid.), but it was neither lived nor internalized.
2.3. Deprivation and Right-Wing Extremist Attitudes in the Representative 
Study
In order to test the findings of the group discussions by 
means of a methodological triangulation, we correlated 
parameters of economic deprivation and other possible 
impact factors with measures of right-wing extremist atti-
tudes by means of two regression models (see section 
2.1.2.). We hypothesized, firstly, that endorsement of right-
wing extremist statements increases if the individual’s 
economic situation deteriorates, both objectively (assessed 
by the level of income) and as subjectively experienced. 
Secondly, we posited that this holds true not only for the 
individual economic situation, but also for the assessment 
of the German economy as a whole. (See Annex 2 for the 
distribution of right-wing extremist attitudes in 2010; see 
Annex 3 for perceived social and political deprivation over 
time). As we developed in our analysis of the group dis-
cussions, we assume that (especially) in (West) Germany 
identification with prosperity replaced identification with 
the “Führer” and a collective fantasy of grandiosity and 
consequently served (and might still serve) the function of 
“narcissistic filling” after the defeat of National Socialism 
and the confrontation with its crimes.
The regression model reveals a surprise with regard to the 
impact of the economic situation. The factors of “income” 
and “experience of unemployment” have no impact on the 
right-wing extremism scores. Relative individual depriva-
tion does not correlate significantly with the scores on the 
right-wing extremism scale; other moderating factors 
prove to be more influential. However, the first model does 
show a significant impact of the estimation of the German 
economy as a whole. This significant impact of “collective” 
economic deprivation can still be shown after controlling 
for the socio-structural variables of educational back-
ground, age and gender. Since including the moderating 
variables increases the explanatory power from approxi-
mately 8 percent to 10 percent, we shall focus in the follow-
ing on the second model.
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Table 1: Economic deprivation in Germany (West and East) findings of Rippl and Baier regarding the impact factors of 
ethnocentric attitudes: “feelings of deprivation at the group 
level that remain meaningful independently from individual 
deprivation” (2005, 662, translated).
If calculated separately for eastern Germany (the former 
German Democratic Republic) and western Germany, the 
model reveals significant differences. First of all, the 
explanatory power rises from approximately 10 percent to 
20 percent. What is more, differentiating between eastern 
and western Germany shifts the levels of significance. 
While for the western states the pattern of influencing fac-
tors is similar to the model as a whole (see Table 1), in the 
former GDR individual income shows a highly significant 
impact on right-wing-extremism (see Table 2); concern 
about employment nearly reaches the threshold of sig-
nificance. We thus gain the impression that the impact of 
the individual economic situation is greater in eastern than 
in western Germany, especially with regard to the level of 
income. This might be related to the fact that in eastern 
Germany the job market is more insecure than in the west 
and the unemployment rate is higher. However, the per-
ception of the overall economic situation is not correlated 
significantly with right-wing extremist attitudes.
First of all, the Table 1 shows that all three socio-structural 
variables (education, age, and gender) have a significant 
impact on the scores on the right-wing-extremism scale. 
Whereas education correlates negatively with right-wing-
extremism, age correlates positively. Women tend to score 
significantly less than men; this gender effect remains even 
after controlling for measures of economic, social, and per-
ceived political deprivation.
As already mentioned, the variables of objective and sub-
jective economic situation – as assessed by level of income 
and experience of unemployment – do not have a sig-
nificant impact on the right-wing-extremism scores. Neither 
experience of personal economic deprivation nor concerned 
about employment correlate significantly with right-wing 
extremist attitudes. Consequently, the subjective estimation 
of an individual’s economic situation does not have a sig-
nificant impact on right-wing extremist attitudes. However, 
the measures of deprivation at the “collective” or national 
level do show a significant impact; i.e. the higher the level of 
deprivation, the more likely an endorsement of right-wing 
extremist statements. Experiencing the of prosperity seems 
to be more meaningful at the national or “collective” level 
than at the individual level. This result corresponds with the 
.
Income
Experience of unemployment
Concern about current employment
Individual economic deprivation
Collective economic deprivation (Germany)
Political deprivation
Social deprivation
Education
Female
Age
Constant
Adjusted R²
Model 1
–0.061**
–0.003
–0.025
–0.010
0.120**
0.116**
0.182**
23.869**
0.081
Model 2
–0.026
0.002
0.025
–0.015
0.111**
 0.094**
0.179**
–0.109**
–0.051*
0.095**
26.362**
0.103
*p < .01 **p < .001; N= 2,195
Source: Decker et al. 2012.
Standardized beta coefficients
Table 2: Economic deprivation in East Germany
..
Income
Experience of unemployment
Concern about current employment
Individual economic deprivation
Collective economic deprivation (Germany)
Political deprivation
Social deprivation
Education
Female
Age
Constant
Adjusted R²
Model 1
–0.209**
–0.089
0.139**
–0.092
0.075
0.237**
0.222**
29.160**
0.192
Model 2
–0.159*
–0.094
0.154*
–0.086
0.069
0.211**
0.221**
–0.160*
–0.022
–0.015
36.719**
0.206
*p < .01 **p < .001; N= 2195
Source: Decker et al. 2012.
Standardized beta coefficients
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In model 2 for eastern Germany alone, the impact of col-
lective economic deprivation vanishes. We therefore posit 
that the individual economic situation is more important 
in the former GDR than in the former West Germany. As 
much as participation in prosperity is desired at an indi-
vidual level in eastern Germany, a collective identity regu-
lated by identification with “national” wealth (as symbolic 
of power) is more pronounced in western Germany.
Let us return to the impact of the level of income: whereas 
its impact remains statistically insignificant in model 2 (see 
table 1), income does have a significant impact in model 1 
(which excludes the socio-structural variables of age, 
gender, and education). Thus, the effect is overpowered by 
other variables in the second model. Since income and 
education are highly correlated, we conclude that edu-
cation trumps the impact of income. The effect of political 
deprivation is similar to the effect of collective economic 
deprivation. Holding a fatalistic worldview, according to 
which the individual has no impact on politics, is a strong 
predictor of right-wing extremist attitudes. Social depriva-
tion proves to have the greatest impact of all the investi-
gated variables.
3. Discussion
By means of a methodological triangulation we analyzed in 
detail the connection of economic deprivation and right-
wing extremist attitudes. We interpret the function of pros-
perity as a collective object serving the regulation of 
self-esteem. In times of economic decline or crisis this inte-
grating potential loses its cohesiveness and right-wing 
extremist attitudes become manifest. We suggest grasping 
the psychosocial function of prosperity with the metaphor 
of “narcissistic filling.” In post-war (West) Germany the 
“filling” replaced the “collective” identification with great-
ness as embodied in the image of the “Führer”. The collec-
tive meaning of the object of a “strong economy” has been 
transmitted intergenerationally. Whenhe wealth crumbles, 
as many people are experiencing for instance during the 
current economic crisis, the filling comes out and the defi-
cits in democratization become apparent. Furthermore, the 
loss of the object of identification leads to an increase in 
authoritarian aggression. The Authoritarian Personality 
described by Fromm and Adorno is ambivalent towards 
authority: the idealization of the authority allows for feel-
ings of greatness and power, but it also involves submission 
which in turn motivates aggression that he or she displaces 
onto less powerful objects. If the idealized object loses 
power, the authoritarian personality is narcissistically hurt 
and responds with intensified anger. The same auth-
oritarian dynamic can be observed with regard to the idea-
lized “object” of the economy.
Although additional impact factors influence right-wing 
extremist attitudes (Decker et al. 2006), the regression 
analysis allows our findings of the group discussions to be 
specified. Whereas in eastern Germany individual access to 
commodities, ergo individual prosperity regulates “collec-
tive” identifications and self-esteem, in western Germany 
they are regulated by identification with (a flourishing) 
economy. Conceivably, “eastern Germans” are less ident-
ified with the economic structure, whereas in western Ger-
many the post-war identification with the “hard 
Deutschmark” might still prevail even in times of econ-
omic crisis.
Durkheim’s studies on the impact of religious beliefs on 
individual socialization have already indicated how histori-
cal traditions influence cultures of everyday life, even if the 
majority is not religious (1997, 164). His theory of anomy 
also elucidates our thesis on the psychosocial function of 
wealth. When the regulating function of (individual and 
collective) self-esteem through religion decreased, the sig-
nificance of economics took over (Weber 2000; Parsons 
1940). More recently, Deutschmann (1999) and Türcke 
(2002) explored the religious underbelly of economy; and 
with their analysis our metaphor of “narcissistic filling” 
also gains in sociological significance. We do not suggest 
that the economy only began to serve the function of a col-
lective ego ideal after World War II, nor that it only served 
this function in Germany. However, we assume that the 
cultural connotations and meanings have developed dif-
ferently in other countries with different histories. Talcott 
Parsons and more recent studies in the United States (Kintz 
1997) might be a starting point for further analyses.
In any case, our metaphor of “narcissistic filling” might be 
useful to help grasp the meaning of global or collective 
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experiences of deprivation; our findings are in accord with 
other studies on the connection between deprivation and 
right-wing-extremism. They also resonate with Tajfel and 
Turner’s theory of social identity as well as with the under-
standing of cultural artifacts as “anxiety buffers” (Green-
berg et al. 1997; see also Jonas and Fritsche 2005) in Terror 
Management Theory.
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Annex
Annex 1  
The Leipzig scale on right-wing extremist attitudes
Annex 2 
Right-wing-extremist attitudes in western and eastern Germany, 2010 
(in percent)
For the national interest a dictatorship is the best form of government 
under certain conditions. (1)*
If it were not for the extermination of the Jews, Hitler would be regarded as 
a great statesman. (6)
Germany needs a strong single party that represents the ethnic community 
as a whole. (1)
We should have a leader who rules Germany with an iron hand for the 
greater good. (1)
As in nature, in society the fittest should win. (5)
Foreigners only come to this country to abuse the welfare state. (3)
Jews still have too much influence. (4)
It is about time that we regained a strong sense of patriotism. (2)
In fact, the Germans are naturally superior to other ethnic groups. (5)
When the unemployment rate rises, foreigners should be sent back home. (3)
Jews play more dirty tricks to achieve their goals than other people do. (4)
The crimes of National Socialism have been highly exaggerated in histori-
ography. (6)
What we need in our country is to forcefully and aggressively assert German 
interests towards foreign countries. (2)
The primary goal of German politics should be to give Germany the power 
and prestige that we deserve. (2)
There is worthy and unworthy life. (5)
Foreigners dangerously pollute Germany. (3)
The Jews are just peculiar and don’t really fit in with us. (4)
National Socialism had its positive aspects. (6)
(Numbers in parentheses indicate the dimension on the right-wing-extremism scale, see Annex 2).
...
Approval of a right-wing dictatorship (1)* 
Chauvinism (2)
Xenophobia (3)
Anti-Semitism (4)
Social Darwinism (5)
Downplaying of National Socialism (6)
Right-wing-extremist world-view 
Germany
5.1
19.3
24.7
8.7
4.0
3.3
8.2
Western 
(N=1,907)
4.6
19.2
21.9
9.0
3.4
3.7
10.5
Eastern 
(N=504)
6.8
19.8
35.0
7.7
6.2
1.8
7.6
Average agreement per item > 3.5 on five-point scale (“1” = “I totally agree”, “3” = “partly agree/
partly disagree”, “5”= “I completely agree”)
Annex 3 
Perceived social and political deprivation over time (in percent)
....
People like me don’t 
have any impact on the 
government anyway. 
I think it’s useless to en-
gage in politics. 
There are not enough 
people who accept me 
the way I am. 
I don’t feel good and 
safe in my personal en-
vironment.
Germany
2006
78.9
68.8
19.1
12.9
2010
79.4
70.9
19.5
13.3
Western
2006
76.7
66.8
19.3
13.3
2010
78.5
70.2
19.1
13.4
Eastern
2006
87.6
77.3
18.2
11.3
2010
82.9
73.5
21.3
12.8
Percentage who “agree” or “totally agree”
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